• What is a Confidentiality Agreement and Why are they So Important?
    in: Business, confidential information, Confidentiality, confidentiality agreement, confidentiality agreements, contract, Contracts 101, Educational Information for Inventors, Inventors Information, IP News, IPWatchdog Articles, IPWatchdog.com Articles, nda, nondisclosure agreements, secrecy requirement, trade secret, Trade Secret Law, trade secrets  | 

    What is a Confidentiality Agreement and Why are they So Important?

    A Confidentiality Agreement, which is also known as non-disclosure agreement or simply as an NDA, is simply a contract between two or more parties where the subject of the agreement is a promise that information conveyed will be maintained in secrecy…..

  • Federal Circuits invalidates patent covering starting a session on one communication-enabled device and transferring it to another
    in: appeals, CAFC, courts, CRFD Research v. v. Matal, DISH, echostar, Federal Circuit, Federal Circuit Review, hulu, Inter Partes, inter partes review, IP News, IPR, IPWatchdog Articles, IPWatchdog.com Articles, Iron Dome, Judge Haldane Robert Mayer, Judge Kathleen O'Malley, Judge Pauline Newman, netflix, non obviousness, Patently-O, patents, Post Grant Procedures, Spotify, U.S. Patent No. 7191233  | 

    Federal Circuits invalidates patent covering starting a session on one communication-enabled device and transferring it to another

    The Federal Circuit decision in the case of CRFD Research v. Matal resolves three appeals involving a single patent: CRFD’s ‘233 patent describing methods and systems that allow a user to begin a session on one communication-enabled device and transfer it to another… Lack of anticipation based on a single reference does not preclude a finding of obviousness based on the same reference. Even if a reference’s is insufficient for anticipation, which is a question of fact, that same reference…

  • CAFC addresses immoral/scandalous marks in Brunetti; 2(a) bar found unconstitutional
    in: 未分類  | 

    CAFC addresses immoral/scandalous marks in Brunetti; 2(a) bar found unconstitutional

    From the opening:


    Erik Brunetti appeals from the decision of the Trademark
    Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirming the
    examining attorney’s refusal to register the mark FUCT
    because it comprises immoral or scandalous matter under
    15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (“§ 2(a)”). We hold substantial evidence
    supports the Board’s findings and it did not err
    concluding the mark comprises immoral or scandalous
    matter. We conclude, however, that § 2(a)’s bar on registering
    immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional
    restriction of free speech. We therefore reverse the
    Board’s holding that Mr. Brunetti’s mark is unregistrable.

    Yes, Tam is cited:


    When Mr. Brunetti filed his appeal, his constitutional
    argument was foreclosed by binding precedent. In
    McGinley, our predecessor court held the refusal to register
    a mark under § 2(a) does not bar the applicant from
    using the mark, and therefore does not implicate the First
    Amendment. 660 F.2d at 484. Commentators heavily
    criticized McGinley and our continued reliance on it,
    particularly in light of the many changes to First
    Amendment jurisprudence over the last thirty years. In
    re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1333–34 & n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en
    banc). We reconsidered McGinley en banc in Tam, which
    held the disparagement provision of § 2(a) unconstitutional
    under the First Amendment because it discriminated
    on the basis of content, message, and viewpoint. Id.
    at 1334–37, 1358. We held that, although trademarks
    serve a commercial purpose as source identifiers in the
    marketplace, the disparagement provision of § 2(a) related
    to the expressive character of marks, not their commercial
    purpose. Id. at 1337–39. As either a contentbased
    or viewpoint-based regulation of expressive speech,
    the disparagement provision was subject to strict scrutiny.
    Id. at 1339. It was undisputed that the measure did
    not survive such scrutiny. Id.

    What the government argued:


    The government concedes that § 2(a)’s bar on registering
    immoral or scandalous marks is a content-based
    restriction on speech. Oral Arg. at 11:57–12:05. And the
    government does not assert that the immoral or scandalous
    provision survives strict scrutiny review. Instead, the
    government contends § 2(a)’s content-based bar on registering
    immoral or scandalous marks does not implicate
    the First Amendment because trademark registration is
    either a government subsidy program or limited public
    forum. Gov’t Letter Br. 14, In re Brunetti, No. 15-1109,
    Docket No. 60 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2017); Oral Arg.
    at 12:06–21, 18:15–39. Alternatively, the government
    argues trademarks are commercial speech implicating
    only the intermediate level of scrutiny set forth in Central
    Hudson. Gov’t Letter Br. 15, In re Brunetti, No. 15-1109,
    Docket No. 60 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2017); Oral Arg.
    at 35:05–17. Under a less exacting degree of scrutiny, the
    government argues the immoral or scandalous provision
    is an appropriate content-based restriction tailored to
    substantial government interests. We consider these
    arguments in turn.

    Footnote 1 is of interest:


    The government maintains that our en banc decision
    in Tam is not binding on this panel in light of the
    Supreme Court’s decision in Tam. Oral Arg. at 12:23–
    13:36, 15:43–54. We question the force of this assertion
    because the Supreme Court did not reverse or otherwise
    cast doubt on the continuing validity of our government
    subsidy analysis and other aspects of our decision in Tam.
    See Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 F.3d 1136, 1138 n.1 (9th
    Cir. 2016); Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 166
    n.28 (2d Cir. 2015). Because we independently reach the
    same conclusion as the en banc court, we need not decide
    whether that holding continues to bind future panel
    decisions in this circuit.

    As to the standard of review:


    As in the case of disparaging marks, the
    PTO’s rejections under § 2(a)’s bar on immoral or scandalous
    marks are necessarily based in the government’s
    belief that the rejected mark conveys an expressive message—namely,
    a message that is scandalous or offensive
    to a substantial composite of the general population. See
    Tam, 808 F.3d at 1338. Section 2(a) regulates the expressive
    components of speech, not the commercial components
    of speech, and as such it should be subject to strict
    scrutiny. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S.
    552, 565 (2011). There is no dispute that § 2(a)’s bar on
    the registration of immoral or scandalous marks is unconstitutional
    if strict scrutiny applies.

    The Hustler case is cited:

    Second, Supreme Court precedent makes clear that
    the government’s general interest in protecting the public
    from marks it deems “off-putting,” whether to protect the
    general public or the government itself, is not a substantial
    interest justifying broad suppression of speech. “[T]he
    fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient
    reason for suppressing it.” Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
    Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988); Bolger v. Youngs Drug
    Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983) (“At least where
    obscenity is not involved, we have consistently held that
    the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some
    does not justify its suppression.” (citation omitted));
    Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“[T]he mere
    presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does
    not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech
    capable of giving offense.”); Cox, 379 U.S. at 551
    (“[C]onstitutional rights may not be denied simply because
    of hostility to their assertion or exercise.”). “Where
    the designed benefit of a content-based speech restriction
    is to shield the sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is
    that the right of expression prevails, even where no less
    restrictive alternative exists.” Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Tam supports our
    conclusion that the government’s interest in protecting
    the public from off-putting marks is an inadequate government
    interest for First Amendment purposes.

    The George Carlin case was cited:


    Finally, the government does not have a substantial
    interest in protecting the public from scandalousness and
    profanities. The government attempts to justify this
    interest by pointing to the Supreme Court’s decision in
    FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In
    Pacifica, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
    of the FCC’s declaratory order determining that an afternoon
    radio broadcast of George Carlin’s “Filthy Words”
    monologue was indecent and potentially sanctionable. Id.
    at 730–32. The Court explained “references to excretory
    and sexual material . . . surely lie at the periphery of First
    Amendment concern.” Id. at 742. The Court justified the
    FCC’s order, however, because radio broadcasting has “a
    uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans”
    and is “uniquely accessible to children, even those too
    young to read,” confronting Americans “in the privacy of
    the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone
    plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
    intruder.” Id. at 749. The Court stressed: “It is appropriate
    to emphasize the narrowness of our holding.” Id. at
    750. S

    The matter of inconsistency arose:


    Finally, no matter the government’s interest, it cannot
    meet the fourth prong of Central Hudson. The PTO’s
    inconsistent application of the immoral or scandalous
    provision creates an “uncertainty [that] undermines the
    likelihood that the [provision] has been carefully tailored.”
    See Reno, 521 U.S. at 871. Nearly identical marks have
    been approved by one examining attorney and rejected as
    scandalous or immoral by another. The PTO registered
    the mark FUGLY for use on clothing, but refused registration
    for use on alcoholic beverages. Compare Reg.
    No. 5,135,615, with Appl. No. 78,866,347. See also
    COCAINE, Appl. No. 78,829,207 (rejected), COCAINE,
    Reg. No. 1,340,874 (accepted). The PTO registered NO
    BS! BRASS, Reg. No. Reg. No. 5,053,827, for entertainment
    services but rejected NO BS ZONE, Appl.
    No. 76,626,390, for internet training. NO $#!+, Appl.
    No. 85,855,449, was rejected, but $#*! MY DAD SAYS,
    Reg. No. 4,142,745, was allowed. See also ROLL TURD,
    Appl. No. 86,448,988 (rejected), TURD HERDERS, Reg.
    No. 5,180,286 (registered). Although the language in
    these marks is offensive, we cannot discern any pattern
    indicating when the incorporation of an offensive term
    into a mark will serve as a bar to registration and when it
    will not.

    There was an opinion by Judge DYK concurring in the judgment.

  • CAFC addresses immoral/scandalous marks in Brunetti; 2(a) bar found unconstitutional

    From the opening:


    Erik Brunetti appeals from the decision of the Trademark
    Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirming the
    examining attorney’s refusal to register the mark FUCT
    because it comprises immoral or scandalous matter under
    15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (“§ 2(a)”). We hold substantial evidence
    supports the Board’s findings and it did not err
    concluding the mark comprises immoral or scandalous
    matter. We conclude, however, that § 2(a)’s bar on registering
    immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional
    restriction of free speech. We therefore reverse the
    Board’s holding that Mr. Brunetti’s mark is unregistrable.

    Yes, Tam is cited:


    When Mr. Brunetti filed his appeal, his constitutional
    argument was foreclosed by binding precedent. In
    McGinley, our predecessor court held the refusal to register
    a mark under § 2(a) does not bar the applicant from
    using the mark, and therefore does not implicate the First
    Amendment. 660 F.2d at 484. Commentators heavily
    criticized McGinley and our continued reliance on it,
    particularly in light of the many changes to First
    Amendment jurisprudence over the last thirty years. In
    re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1333–34 & n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en
    banc). We reconsidered McGinley en banc in Tam, which
    held the disparagement provision of § 2(a) unconstitutional
    under the First Amendment because it discriminated
    on the basis of content, message, and viewpoint. Id.
    at 1334–37, 1358. We held that, although trademarks
    serve a commercial purpose as source identifiers in the
    marketplace, the disparagement provision of § 2(a) related
    to the expressive character of marks, not their commercial
    purpose. Id. at 1337–39. As either a contentbased
    or viewpoint-based regulation of expressive speech,
    the disparagement provision was subject to strict scrutiny.
    Id. at 1339. It was undisputed that the measure did
    not survive such scrutiny. Id.

    What the government argued:


    The government concedes that § 2(a)’s bar on registering
    immoral or scandalous marks is a content-based
    restriction on speech. Oral Arg. at 11:57–12:05. And the
    government does not assert that the immoral or scandalous
    provision survives strict scrutiny review. Instead, the
    government contends § 2(a)’s content-based bar on registering
    immoral or scandalous marks does not implicate
    the First Amendment because trademark registration is
    either a government subsidy program or limited public
    forum. Gov’t Letter Br. 14, In re Brunetti, No. 15-1109,
    Docket No. 60 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2017); Oral Arg.
    at 12:06–21, 18:15–39. Alternatively, the government
    argues trademarks are commercial speech implicating
    only the intermediate level of scrutiny set forth in Central
    Hudson. Gov’t Letter Br. 15, In re Brunetti, No. 15-1109,
    Docket No. 60 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2017); Oral Arg.
    at 35:05–17. Under a less exacting degree of scrutiny, the
    government argues the immoral or scandalous provision
    is an appropriate content-based restriction tailored to
    substantial government interests. We consider these
    arguments in turn.

    Footnote 1 is of interest:


    The government maintains that our en banc decision
    in Tam is not binding on this panel in light of the
    Supreme Court’s decision in Tam. Oral Arg. at 12:23–
    13:36, 15:43–54. We question the force of this assertion
    because the Supreme Court did not reverse or otherwise
    cast doubt on the continuing validity of our government
    subsidy analysis and other aspects of our decision in Tam.
    See Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 F.3d 1136, 1138 n.1 (9th
    Cir. 2016); Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 166
    n.28 (2d Cir. 2015). Because we independently reach the
    same conclusion as the en banc court, we need not decide
    whether that holding continues to bind future panel
    decisions in this circuit.

    As to the standard of review:


    As in the case of disparaging marks, the
    PTO’s rejections under § 2(a)’s bar on immoral or scandalous
    marks are necessarily based in the government’s
    belief that the rejected mark conveys an expressive message—namely,
    a message that is scandalous or offensive
    to a substantial composite of the general population. See
    Tam, 808 F.3d at 1338. Section 2(a) regulates the expressive
    components of speech, not the commercial components
    of speech, and as such it should be subject to strict
    scrutiny. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S.
    552, 565 (2011). There is no dispute that § 2(a)’s bar on
    the registration of immoral or scandalous marks is unconstitutional
    if strict scrutiny applies.

    The Hustler case is cited:

    Second, Supreme Court precedent makes clear that
    the government’s general interest in protecting the public
    from marks it deems “off-putting,” whether to protect the
    general public or the government itself, is not a substantial
    interest justifying broad suppression of speech. “[T]he
    fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient
    reason for suppressing it.” Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
    Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988); Bolger v. Youngs Drug
    Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983) (“At least where
    obscenity is not involved, we have consistently held that
    the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some
    does not justify its suppression.” (citation omitted));
    Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“[T]he mere
    presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does
    not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech
    capable of giving offense.”); Cox, 379 U.S. at 551
    (“[C]onstitutional rights may not be denied simply because
    of hostility to their assertion or exercise.”). “Where
    the designed benefit of a content-based speech restriction
    is to shield the sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is
    that the right of expression prevails, even where no less
    restrictive alternative exists.” Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Tam supports our
    conclusion that the government’s interest in protecting
    the public from off-putting marks is an inadequate government
    interest for First Amendment purposes.

    The George Carlin case was cited:


    Finally, the government does not have a substantial
    interest in protecting the public from scandalousness and
    profanities. The government attempts to justify this
    interest by pointing to the Supreme Court’s decision in
    FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In
    Pacifica, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
    of the FCC’s declaratory order determining that an afternoon
    radio broadcast of George Carlin’s “Filthy Words”
    monologue was indecent and potentially sanctionable. Id.
    at 730–32. The Court explained “references to excretory
    and sexual material . . . surely lie at the periphery of First
    Amendment concern.” Id. at 742. The Court justified the
    FCC’s order, however, because radio broadcasting has “a
    uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans”
    and is “uniquely accessible to children, even those too
    young to read,” confronting Americans “in the privacy of
    the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone
    plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
    intruder.” Id. at 749. The Court stressed: “It is appropriate
    to emphasize the narrowness of our holding.” Id. at
    750. S

    The matter of inconsistency arose:


    Finally, no matter the government’s interest, it cannot
    meet the fourth prong of Central Hudson. The PTO’s
    inconsistent application of the immoral or scandalous
    provision creates an “uncertainty [that] undermines the
    likelihood that the [provision] has been carefully tailored.”
    See Reno, 521 U.S. at 871. Nearly identical marks have
    been approved by one examining attorney and rejected as
    scandalous or immoral by another. The PTO registered
    the mark FUGLY for use on clothing, but refused registration
    for use on alcoholic beverages. Compare Reg.
    No. 5,135,615, with Appl. No. 78,866,347. See also
    COCAINE, Appl. No. 78,829,207 (rejected), COCAINE,
    Reg. No. 1,340,874 (accepted). The PTO registered NO
    BS! BRASS, Reg. No. Reg. No. 5,053,827, for entertainment
    services but rejected NO BS ZONE, Appl.
    No. 76,626,390, for internet training. NO $#!+, Appl.
    No. 85,855,449, was rejected, but $#*! MY DAD SAYS,
    Reg. No. 4,142,745, was allowed. See also ROLL TURD,
    Appl. No. 86,448,988 (rejected), TURD HERDERS, Reg.
    No. 5,180,286 (registered). Although the language in
    these marks is offensive, we cannot discern any pattern
    indicating when the incorporation of an offensive term
    into a mark will serve as a bar to registration and when it
    will not.

    There was an opinion by Judge DYK concurring in the judgment.

    Continue Reading ...
  • New ABA Opinion of Particular Interest

    A lawyer may be adverse to a former client, but not in the same matter in which she represented the client, or in one which is “substantially related” to the representation of the former client.  Generally, this requires determining whether it is reasonably likely that in the representation, the lawyer likely learned confidential information that likely can […]

    Continue Reading ...
  • Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2017) — One Last Dance . . .

    By Andrew Williams — Last June, in Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., the Supreme Court handed down its interpretation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”) for the approval of biosimilar drugs. As we reported at the time, the Court held that the 180-day notice-of-commercial-marketing provision of the statute may be provided either before or after receiving FDA approval. In addition, with respect to the so-called “Patent Dance,” the Supreme Court held that a reference product sponsor (“RPS”) cannot seek enforcement of the aBLA disclosure provision in 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) by injunction under federal law. This ruling…

    Continue Reading ...
  • Inside Views: Obviousness In The Wake Of Arendi

    Since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc. last August,[1] many patent commentators have asserted that the decision marked a significant change in the analysis of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, especially as a weakening of single-reference obviousness grounds. Notwithstanding this decision, petitioners and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board have continued to rely on single-reference obviousness to assert and find that claims are obvious, write Amy Simpson and Kyle Canavera.

    Continue Reading ...
  • 一致

                            目次はこちら

    一致

    –>fit, match,

    (AGREE)
    $$ The first step is to agree a common semantic information model. / 第1ステップは共通の意味的情報モデルについて一致を取ることである。(USP8311972)

    $$ The reduction current grows with the short circuit current increase in agreement with the microband equation: / 還元電流は、次のマイクロバンド式に一致して短絡電流の増大と共に増大する: (USP8239138)

    (COINCIDE)
    $$ The centreline of the sinusoidal path 27b is preferably coincident with the centreline of the track 101. / 正弦波経路27bの中心線は、トラック101の中心線と一致することが好ましい。(USP8243382)

    $$ Preferably, the lateral positioning protrusions (i.e. the abutments) are not coincident with the projections. / 好ましくは、横方向に位置決めする突出部(すなわち当接部)は、突出部と一致しない。(USP8141265)

    $$ The second route is selected to coincide with the controlled release of the pre-concentrated agents from the pre-concentrator. / 第2の経路は前濃縮装置からの前濃縮された薬剤の制御された放出と一致するように選択される。(USP7619265)

    (CONFORM)
    $$ As soon as the TIFF conformity analysing device rejects one strip, the whole TIFF file is rejected. / TIFF一致解析装置が1つの帯片を拒絶すると、TIFFファイル全体が拒絶される。(USP8185954)

    $$ The CANbus network nodes may conform to the FMS CANbus standard. / CANbusネットワークノードはFMS CANbus規格に一致する。(USP8099207)

    $$ If the data does conform it is regenerated by the conformity analysing device. / 一致する場合、データは一致解析装置によって再生される。(USP8185954):

    (CONSISTENT)
    $$ Alternatively or in addition, those edges most consistent with a skeletal model are selected as reference image features. / 代わりに、あるいはそれに加えて、骨格モデルに最も一致するエッジを、基準画像特徴として選択する。(USP8241125)

    $$ These discriminators are chosen such that they produce solutions consistent with the initial solution to the initial problem. / これらのディスクリミネータは、該ディスクリミネータが、初期の問題に対する初期の解と一致する解を生じさせるように選ばれる。(USP8121346)

    $$ This activity is also consistent with the transformation of Au(III) species to Au(0) caused by calcination. / この活性もまた焼成によって生じるAu(III)類のAu(0)への変換に一致する。(USP8104484)

    (CORRESPOND)
    $$ An area Starget is defined, which corresponds to a template area centred on the new target position. / 新しい目標位置に中心をおいたテンプレート領域に一致する領域Stargetが画定される。(USP8121346)

    $$ Also the shutter position in FIG. 1B does not correspond to that of FIG. 1A. / また、図1Bのシャッタの位置は図1Aの位置とは一致しない。(USP8225754)

    $$ Distal cutout width W11 corresponds to the width of uncoated portion 102u. / 先端カットアウト幅W11は、非コーティング部分102uの幅に一致する。(USP7653492)

    (FIT)
    $$ First, during manufacturing the fitting of the discrete components requires additional processing steps. / まず、製造している間に、分離した構成要素を一致させることは追加的なステップを要求することになる。(USP6681102)

    $$ These features are required only on the line (ring) ports of an ADM, and therefore not all ports on a cross-connect would in future need to be fitted with them. / それらの特徴は、ADMのライン(リング)のポート上のみにおいて要求される。従って、交差接続上のすべてのポートがその特徴において一致する必要はない。(USP5533005)

    (LINE)
    $$ In this first stage, illustrated in FIG. 2, the end of the wire 3A is generally in line with axis X and is located within plane XY. / 図2に示されるように、この第1段階において、ワイヤ3Aの端部が、おおむね軸線Xに一致し、XY平面内に配される。(USP8080016)

    $$ It falls to a minimum as it passes through the centre of the source and the axis of the field is in line with the coil. / ロボットが磁気源の中心を通るときに誘導電圧は最小値となり、磁界の軸線がコイルと一致する。(USP6031371)

    (MATCH)
    $$ The kinetic energies of the reagent anions (or reagent gas) and the analyte cations can be closely matched. / 試薬アニオン(または、試薬ガス)および分析種カチオンの運動エネルギーは、極めて一致するようにされ得る。(USP8283626)

    $$ This produces a mismatch between the control part’s position and the variator ratio. / この状態は、制御部品の位置とバリエータの比との間に不一致を生じさせる。(USP8282525)

    $$ A correlation-like process is used to determine the best match position. / 相関関係のようなプロセスが、最適の一致の位置を決定するために使用される。(USP8121346)

    $$ This is achieved by detecting if any existing entries partially match the new request. / これは、任意の既存のエントリが新たな要求と部分的に一致するかを検出することにより達成される。(USP8174978)

    $$ The MAVIS-2 project [19] uses quad trees and a simple grid to obtain spatial matching between image regions. / MAVIS-2プロジェクト[19]は、画像領域間の空間一致を得るためにカドツリー(quad trees)及び単純なグリッドを使用する。(USP7593602)

    $$ Upon finding a match with a token identity, the electronic file(s) (16) linked thereto are identified. / トークンアイデンティティとの一致を検出すると、それにリンクされた電子ファイル(複数の場合がある)(16)が識別される。(USP7578441)

    (OTHERS)
    $$ The torque spike caused by the engagement is minimised due to the speed synchronisation step. / 係合によって生じるトルクのスパイクは、速度一致ステップによって最小限に抑えられる。(USP8171814): synchronize

    $$ As an alternative, measurements may be made at different points with some possibility of discrepancies between measurements. / その代わりに、測定は異なる地点で行ってもよく、このときは測定が一致しない可能性がある。(USP7319673): discrepancy

    $$ The inverter has full control of each motor 114 in unison to ensure that the speeds are constantly matched. / インバータは、それぞれのモータ114を一斉に完全制御して、速度が常に一致するようにする。(USP7090586): unison

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