• Patent Litigation Shows Shift Towards Delaware, Decrease in High-Volume Plaintiff Filings

    Legal data analytics provider Lex Machina recently published a post featuring data points regarding the filing of patent infringement cases in the year following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group Brands. In that decision, the Court held that the patent venue statute (28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)) meant that domestic companies could only file patent infringement suits in the judicial district where they were incorporated. Lex Machina’s one-year data update shows that…

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  • Pernix Ireland Pain DAC v. Alvogen Malta Operations Ltd. (D. Del. 2018)

    Method of Treatment Claims Patent Eligible Even without Reciting Dosages By Kevin E. Noonan — It appears that Judge William C. Bryson, U.S. Appellate Court Judge on the Federal Circuit bench, is riding the circuit these days, peripatetically ruling on the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe’s motion to join ANDA litigation in the Eastern District of Texas last October and, last week, denying Defendant’s motion to reconsider his grant of summary judgment that the claims at issue in Pernix Ireland Pain DAC v. Alvogen Malta Operations Ltd. were not invalid for being patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The…

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  • Inside Views: En finir avec l’accès aux ressources génétiques sans autorisation (c’est-à-dire avec la biopiraterie): « l’ouverture limitée »

    L’ « accès aux ressources génétiques » et le « partage juste et équitable des avantages découlant de leur utilisation » s’est révelé un véritable casse-tête pour l’ensemble des 13 Conférences des Parties à la Convention des Nations Unies sur la Diversité Biologique (CDB). La formule, entre guillemets, qu’on désigne par l’acronyme « APA », se réfère au troisième objectif de la Convention, lequel est étroitement liée aux deux premiers, à savoir la conservation et l’utilisation durable de ces ressources. Malgré 25 années consécutives d’efforts et dans un contexte où le marché de la biotechnologie représente, annuellement, un trillion de dollars, peu d’accords APA ont été conclus jusqu’ici. Les bénéfices monétaires des quelques contrats existants sont si faibles que les contractants répugnent à les dévoiler. La « législation APA brésilienne » de 2015, qui est entrée en vigueur le 6 novembre 2017, permet par exemple d’offrir des royalties jusqu’à un dixième de pour cent du chiffre d’affaire. Selon les termes d’un éminent juriste: « les usagers paient des cacachuètes pour se servir de la biodiversité ».

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  • Notice before Attorney Fee Request

    Notice before Attorney Fee Request

    By Dennis Crouch

    Stone Basket Innovations, LLC v. Cook Med. LLC, 17-2330, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 15670 (Fed. Cir. 2018)

    Typical initial setup of a patent infringement lawsuit: the patentee (Stone’) sued Cook for infringement; Cook then requested an inter partes of the asserted patent.  What happened next was odd — after Cook refused a $150k settlement, Stone conceded the IPR (all claims then cancelled) as well as the lawsuit (dismissed with prejudice).

    Note here that the invention looks pretty cool – an endoscope with a basket-type device for extracting stones from a human body — such as ureteral, kidney, or gall stones. U.S. Patent No. 6,551,327.  The problem apparently is the invention’s lack of novelty. 

    The Patent Act provides that a “court in exceptional cases may award
    reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285.  In Octane
    Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), the Supreme Court defined an “exceptional Case” as one that “stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.”  That particular determination is made by a district court judge on a case-by-case basis after considering the “totality of the circumstances” and then given deference on appeal. 

    Continue reading Notice before Attorney Fee Request at Patently-O.

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  • Rethinking Article III Standing in IPR Appeals at the Federal Circuit

    In 2011, as part of the American Invents Act (“AIA”), Congress significantly restructured the way in which previously issued patents could be challenged.   In some cases, existing post-issuance proceedings, like ex parte reexamination and reissue proceedings, were kept intact as such proceedings existed prior to the AIA.  In other cases, existing post-issuance proceedings, like inter […]

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  • Mobileeye loses appeal at CAFC of PTAB decision. Velocity vs. displacement.

    MobileEye lost:

    Mobileye Vision Technologies Ltd. (“Mobileye”) appeals
    from the final written decision of the United States
    Patent and Trademark Office Patent Trial and Appeal
    Board (“the Board”) in an inter partes reexamination
    affirming the examiner’s rejection of claims 1–7 of U.S.
    Patent 7,113,867 (“the ’867 patent”) as obvious. See
    iOnRoad, Ltd. v. Mobileye Techs. Ltd., No. 2015-7925,
    2016 WL 949027, at *8 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 11, 2016) (“Decision”).
    On appeal, Mobileye only challenges the Board’s
    decision with respect to claim 6. Because the Board did
    not err in its decision, we affirm.

    The scope of the appeal was narrow:

    Only claim 6 is before us. Mobileye argues that the
    Board’s claim construction of the “substantially uniformly
    approaches zero” limitation to “merely mean[] that the
    obstacle is closing in on the vehicle, and that they will
    intersect,” see Decision, 2016 WL 949027, at *7 (internal
    quotation marks omitted), reads out the “substantially
    uniformly” part of the limitation. It further contends that
    the “substantially uniformly” language in the claim
    describes how the lateral displacement approaches zero,
    not just whether it approaches zero. Goodrich, as Mobileye
    characterizes it, does not base its collision determination
    on how the lateral displacement changes, because
    it assumes a constant velocity. Mobileye argues that it
    therefore does not teach the “substantially uniformly”
    limitation in claim 6. Mobileye does not challenge the
    Board’s findings with respect to the other prior art references.

    Note the reasoning:

    We agree with iOnRoad that the Board’s finding that
    Goodrich teaches the “substantially uniformly approaches
    zero” limitation is supported by substantial evidence.
    Mobileye’s arguments depend on distinguishing claim 6 of
    the ’867 patent, which teaches estimating a time to collision
    using a lateral displacement, from Goodrich, which
    teaches collision avoidance based on a lateral velocity.
    Compare ’867 patent col. 8 ll. 12–21, col. 10 ll. 36–39, with
    Goodrich col. 5 ll. 4–9. However, that is a distinction
    without a difference


    At oral argument, Mobileye argued that a key feature
    of the ’867 patent is that it exclusively relies on the lateral
    displacement to estimate the time of contact, which is
    not directly related to the velocity of the obstacle. See
    Oral Arg. at 11:55–12:33. This feature makes a difference,
    Mobileye contended, because an object could be
    moving at a constant velocity, but the changes in its
    lateral displacement with respect to the vehicle could still
    decrease or increase in a non-constant manner. See id.;
    see also ’867 patent fig. 2B. But Goodrich’s collision
    avoidance system does not depend on a constant velocity;
    it depends on a constant “lateral velocity.” Goodrich col. 5
    l. 6 (emphasis added). Therefore, the record does not
    support Mobileye’s attempt to distinguish the prior art.

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