• Enhanced Damages:  Willful Infringement, "Should Have Known," Willful Blindness
    in: enhanced damages, United States  | 

    Enhanced Damages: Willful Infringement, "Should Have Known," Willful Blindness

    As reported by Dennis Crouch recently on Patently-O, on October 2 the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in Bombardier Recreational Producers Inc. v. Arctic Cat Inc., in which the question presented was
    Whether a finding of willful infringement based on In re Seagate’s “should have been known” negligence standard violates the requirement that subjective willfulness must be “intentional or knowing,” as set forth by the Supreme Court in Halo Electronics Inc. v. Pulse Electronics Inc.

    For previous discussion of the Federal Circuit opinion on this blog, see here; see also the Scotus Blog webpage for this case, here.  As Professor Crouch also noted, however, another petition raising essentially the same issue, plus one more, was filed in Corning Optical Communications v. PPC Broadband.  Here are the questions presented:
    1. In determining whether to enhance damages for “egregious” infringement under §284, must courts consider all relevant circumstances, including evidence that the defendant’s position was objectively reasonable?

    2. Does a finding of willful infringement based on a “should have known” standard violate the requirement that willfulness be “intentional or knowing”? 

    It will be interesting to see if the Supreme Court decides to pick this one up.  On a related note, Professor Dmitry Karshtedt recently called to my attention an Order Denying Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss in Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple, Inc., in which Judge Lucy Koh concludes that willful blindness is sufficient to satisfy the “intentional and knowing” standard:
    . . . to state a claim for willful infringement, Corephotonics must allege that Apple knew of Corephotonics’ patents and then acted or continued to act even though it knew that it was infringing Corephotonics’ patents or that the risk of such infringement was obvious. Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1371. . . .

    . . . it has been well-established both before and after the Halo decision that knowledge of a pending patent application does not confer knowledge of an existing patent. . . .

    However, Corephotonics also alleges that in 2016, Apple cited to one of Corephotonics’ issued patents. . . .

    Moreover, Corephotonics also alleges in its pleadings that Apple was “willfully blind” to a high risk that it was infringing Corephotonics’ patents. . . . In Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011), the United States Supreme Court concluded that the doctrine of willful blindness applied to the requirement, in the induced infringement context, that a defendant know its induced acts constitute patent infringement. Id. at 768–69 & n.9. The Global-Tech Court stated that “a willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts.” Id. at 769.

    Apple contends that allowing willful infringement claims based on a defendant’s willful blindness contradicts the Federal Circuit’s statement that “[k]nowledge of the patent alleged to be willfully infringed continues to be a prerequisite for enhanced damages.” WBIP, 829 F.3d at 1341. . . . However, the United States Supreme Court made clear in Global-Tech that a finding of willful blindness is, in effect, a finding of knowledge. 563 U.S. at 770 (discussing how the willful blindness doctrine “permits a finding of knowledge”). Post-Halo, courts have recognized that allegations of willful blindness can satisfy the knowledge requirement for willful infringement. See Straight Path IP Grp., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 2017 WL 3967864, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2017) (denying motion for judgment on the pleadings on an enhanced damages claim predicated on plaintiff’s willful blindness allegation). The Court therefore considers Corephotonics’ willful blindness claims.

    Here, Corephotonics contends that its allegations that Apple knew about Corephotonics’ technology, knew about Corephotonics’ patent applications, and then instructed Corephotonics not to share Corephotonics’ issued patents with Apple raise the inference that Apple “believed that there was a high probability that it was infringing the Asserted Patents, and that Apple took deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.” Opp. at 12. Specifically, Corephotonics alleges that after Corephotonics offered to share its patents with Apple’s technical and business personnel, Apple sent Corephotonics an email in October 2016 stating, “Please do not send any patents to us until further notice. Legal counsel might reach out with any questions.” FAC ¶ 35. At that time, Corephotonics’ ’291 and ’032 patents had issued. FAC ¶¶ 3, 5.

    The Court agrees with Corephotonics that the allegations in the FAC and the ’18 Complaint raise the inference that Apple was at least willfully blind to a high risk that it was infringing Corephotonics’ patents. . . .

    I’m inclined to think Judge Koh is right.  Whether courts will ever go farther, as Professor Karshtedt has urged, and conclude that a reckless failure to search for potentially relevant patents in advance of product launch is relevant to willfulness might be a tougher sell . . . .
  • Patent Prosecution Experience Gap: Getting 2 Years Experience
    in: Gene Quinn, Guest Contributors, IP News, IPWatchdog Articles, IPWatchdog.com Articles, john white, Patent Practice, Patent Prosecution, Patent Prosecution Basics, Patently-O, patents  | 

    Patent Prosecution Experience Gap: Getting 2 Years Experience

    For people starting out in the patent field, virtually all job announcements require some patent prosecution experience. A typical requirement is, for example, at least 2 years of experience in prosecution. I get it. What employer wants to invest in training only to see a person slip away once they can finally do something useful. Rather, you’d like to on-board the person, get them working immediately and discover what gaps may exist from their past experience and work to fill them in. Great…

  • Can the Federal Circuit use Rule 36 Affirmances in PTAB Appeals?
    in: Affirm, amicus briefs, Appellate Review, CAFC, Capella Photonics, cisco system, courts, Federal Circuit, IBM, Inter Partes, inter partes review, IP News, IPR, IPWatchdog Articles, IPWatchdog.com Articles, patent trial and appeal board, Patently-O, patents, PTAB, PTAB Trials, Rule 36 judgment, SCOTUS, TecSec, US Inventor, US Supreme Court  | 

    Can the Federal Circuit use Rule 36 Affirmances in PTAB Appeals?

    Inventor advocacy group US Inventor recently filed an amicus brief with the U.S. Supreme Court asking the nation’s highest court to grant a petition for writ of certiorari in Capella Photonics v. Cisco Systems. This case, if taken up on appeal, will require the Supreme Court to answer whether the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit operates in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 144, the statute governing how the Federal Circuit must respond to appeals of decisions from the U.S. Patent and Trademark…

Enhanced Damages: Willful Infringement, "Should Have Known," Willful Blindness

As reported by Dennis Crouch recently on Patently-O, on October 2 the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in Bombardier Recreational Producers Inc. v. Arctic Cat Inc., in which the question presented was
Whether a finding of willful infringement based on In re Seagate’s “should have been known” negligence standard violates the requirement that subjective willfulness must be “intentional or knowing,” as set forth by the Supreme Court in Halo Electronics Inc. v. Pulse Electronics Inc.

For previous discussion of the Federal Circuit opinion on this blog, see here; see also the Scotus Blog webpage for this case, here.  As Professor Crouch also noted, however, another petition raising essentially the same issue, plus one more, was filed in Corning Optical Communications v. PPC Broadband.  Here are the questions presented:
1. In determining whether to enhance damages for “egregious” infringement under §284, must courts consider all relevant circumstances, including evidence that the defendant’s position was objectively reasonable?

2. Does a finding of willful infringement based on a “should have known” standard violate the requirement that willfulness be “intentional or knowing”? 

It will be interesting to see if the Supreme Court decides to pick this one up.  On a related note, Professor Dmitry Karshtedt recently called to my attention an Order Denying Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss in Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple, Inc., in which Judge Lucy Koh concludes that willful blindness is sufficient to satisfy the “intentional and knowing” standard:
. . . to state a claim for willful infringement, Corephotonics must allege that Apple knew of Corephotonics’ patents and then acted or continued to act even though it knew that it was infringing Corephotonics’ patents or that the risk of such infringement was obvious. Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1371. . . .

. . . it has been well-established both before and after the Halo decision that knowledge of a pending patent application does not confer knowledge of an existing patent. . . .

However, Corephotonics also alleges that in 2016, Apple cited to one of Corephotonics’ issued patents. . . .

Moreover, Corephotonics also alleges in its pleadings that Apple was “willfully blind” to a high risk that it was infringing Corephotonics’ patents. . . . In Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011), the United States Supreme Court concluded that the doctrine of willful blindness applied to the requirement, in the induced infringement context, that a defendant know its induced acts constitute patent infringement. Id. at 768–69 & n.9. The Global-Tech Court stated that “a willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts.” Id. at 769.

Apple contends that allowing willful infringement claims based on a defendant’s willful blindness contradicts the Federal Circuit’s statement that “[k]nowledge of the patent alleged to be willfully infringed continues to be a prerequisite for enhanced damages.” WBIP, 829 F.3d at 1341. . . . However, the United States Supreme Court made clear in Global-Tech that a finding of willful blindness is, in effect, a finding of knowledge. 563 U.S. at 770 (discussing how the willful blindness doctrine “permits a finding of knowledge”). Post-Halo, courts have recognized that allegations of willful blindness can satisfy the knowledge requirement for willful infringement. See Straight Path IP Grp., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 2017 WL 3967864, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2017) (denying motion for judgment on the pleadings on an enhanced damages claim predicated on plaintiff’s willful blindness allegation). The Court therefore considers Corephotonics’ willful blindness claims.

Here, Corephotonics contends that its allegations that Apple knew about Corephotonics’ technology, knew about Corephotonics’ patent applications, and then instructed Corephotonics not to share Corephotonics’ issued patents with Apple raise the inference that Apple “believed that there was a high probability that it was infringing the Asserted Patents, and that Apple took deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.” Opp. at 12. Specifically, Corephotonics alleges that after Corephotonics offered to share its patents with Apple’s technical and business personnel, Apple sent Corephotonics an email in October 2016 stating, “Please do not send any patents to us until further notice. Legal counsel might reach out with any questions.” FAC ¶ 35. At that time, Corephotonics’ ’291 and ’032 patents had issued. FAC ¶¶ 3, 5.

The Court agrees with Corephotonics that the allegations in the FAC and the ’18 Complaint raise the inference that Apple was at least willfully blind to a high risk that it was infringing Corephotonics’ patents. . . .

I’m inclined to think Judge Koh is right.  Whether courts will ever go farther, as Professor Karshtedt has urged, and conclude that a reckless failure to search for potentially relevant patents in advance of product launch is relevant to willfulness might be a tougher sell . . . .
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  • Patent Prosecution Experience Gap: Getting 2 Years Experience

    For people starting out in the patent field, virtually all job announcements require some patent prosecution experience. A typical requirement is, for example, at least 2 years of experience in prosecution. I get it. What employer wants to invest in training only to see a person slip away once they can finally do something useful. Rather, you’d like to on-board the person, get them working immediately and discover what gaps may exist from their past experience and work to fill them in. Great…

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  • Cost-Effective IP Strategies for Biotech Startups

    A well-devised intellectual property (IP) portfolio can go a long way to ensure a startup biotech company’s business success in the marketplace. Patents allow a patent holder to exclude others from making, using, offering to sell, selling or importing a similar product based on what is claimed in the patent while the patent is in force (35 U.S.C. 154). Biotech startups generally invest in utility patents to protect core inventions and serve as barriers to entry against competitors. When faced…

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  • Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Copyright Infringement Claims as Time-Barred and Based on Non-Credible Testimony

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently issued a summary order in Latin American Music Company v. Spanish Broadcasting System affirming a lower court’s judgment denying copyright infringement claims brought by music publisher Latin American Music Co. (LAMCO) against radio station owner Spanish Broadcasting System (SBS). The Second Circuit determined that LAMCO’s arguments on appeal were without merit and upheld findings that its infringement claims were either time-barred or…

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  • Substantive and procedural due process in the Third Circuit

    An actionable claim under 42 USC § 1983 requires: (1) a violation of a right provided under the U.S. Constitution or federal law (2) resulting from a state sanctioned act. Some 1983 plaintiffs allege violations of both their substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. These are distinct species of 1983 claims.

    A plaintiff seeking relief under § 1983 for a violation of procedural due process must demonstrate that “(1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.'” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006). Due process usually requires at least “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S. Ct. 1187, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1965)). The taking of a constitutionally protected property interest without a hearing is nearly a per se violation of procedural due process.

    Within the Third Circuit, a cognizable substantive due process claim may require deprivation of a protected interest by executive action “so ill-conceived or malicious that it shocks the conscience.”

    When a plaintiff specifically invokes PROCEDURAL due process, one might assume procedural due process is the species of claim intended.

    More broadly than in the Third Circuit, “substantive” claims under the 14th Amendment may involve taking of property interests. Within Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1993):

    Later cases have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive protection against uncompensated deprivations
    of private property by the States as though it incorporated the text of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause
    .
    See, e. g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481, n. 10, 94 L. Ed. 2d 472, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
    There was nothing problematic about that interpretation in cases enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment
    against state action that involved the actual physical invasion of private property. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-433, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. at 178-180.
    Justice Holmes charted a significant new course, however, when he opined that a state law making it
    “commercially impracticable to mine certain coal” had “very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes
    as appropriating or destroying it.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414, 67 L. Ed. 322, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922).
    The so-called “regulatory [page 407] takings” doctrine that the Holmes dictum the text of the note kindled
    has an obvious kinship with the line of substantive due process cases that Lochner exemplified.
    Besides having similar ancestry, both doctrines are potentially open-ended sources of judicial power
    to invalidate state economic regulations that Members of this Court view as unwise or unfair.

    Within the Third Circuit, a violation of substantive due process involves conscience-shocking actions:


    “A substantive due process violation occurs if a government official engages in
    ‘an abuse of executive power so clearly unjustified by any legitimate objective of law enforcement’
    that it is barred by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Button v. Snelson, No. 16-1835,
    679 Fed. Appx. 150, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2411, 2017 WL 543184, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2017)
    (quoting City of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998)).
    To establish a valid substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must “prove that
    ‘the particular interest at issue is protected by the substantive due process clause and
    the government’s deprivation of that protected interest shocks the conscience.'” Id.
    (quoting Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008)).
    “”[O]nly the most egregious official conduct’ shocks the conscience.”
    Perano v. Twp. of Tilden, 423 F. App’x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 316 F.3d at 400).

    HOWEVER, one notes that “what is conscience-shocking” may be in the eye of the beholder; from
    STANLEY F. FROMPOVICZ v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147633 (E.D. Pa. August 30, 2018)


    “The substantive component of the Due Process Clause ‘protects individual liberty against ‘certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.'” Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S. Ct. 1061, 117 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1992)). “To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must prove the particular interest at issue is protected by the substantive due process clause and the government’s deprivation of that protected interest shocks the conscience.” Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008). “[C]onduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.” Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998).

    (…)

    First, with respect to the nature of Frompovicz’s property interest, “[t]he United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized that ownership interests in property are interests protected by the substantive aspect of due process.” See M & M Stone Co. v. Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. CIV.A. 07-CV-04784, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76050, 2008 WL 4467176, at *21 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2008) (citing Indep. Enterprises Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1179 n.12 (3d Cir. 1997)). Moreover, “[t]he Third Circuit has explicitly held that cases involving ‘zoning decisions, building permits, or other governmental permission required for some intended use of land owned by the plaintiffs . . . implicat[e] the “fundamental” property interest in the ownership of land.'” Id. (quoting Indep. Enterprises, 103 F.3d at 1179 n.12); see DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for Twp. of W. Amwell, 53 F.3d 592, 601 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by UA Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that a substantive due process right is implicated where a “government decision . . . impinges upon a landowner’s use and enjoyment of property”).

    Here, Frompovicz alleges that Defendants interfered with his use of a DEP operations permit that allowed Frompovicz to “remove and resell spring water for the bottled water industry” from his property in Auburn, Pennsylvania. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 31. The Court finds that Frompovicz’s interest in the permit is protected by substantive due process because this interest concerns the use and enjoyment of his real property. See M & M Stone, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76050, 2008 WL 4467176, at *22 (“Plaintiff’s mining license implicates plaintiff’s fundamental property interest in the use, control and enjoyment [*15] of its real property.”).

    Second, the Court must consider whether Frompovicz has alleged conduct on the part of Defendants that both impinges on his protected property right and “shocks the conscience.” Frompovicz’s Complaint is replete with allegations of “conscience-shocking” conduct on the part of Defendants, but many of these allegations concern alleged conduct that occurred before June 2015 (which Frompovicz admits is irrelevant to his claims) or concern Defendants’ alleged failure to enforce DEP regulations with respect to Frompovicz’s competitor, MCR. This latter conduct—regardless of whether it was “conscience shocking”—did not impinge on Frompovicz’s use and enjoyment of his land. At most, this alleged conduct reduced the value of Frompovicz’s operations permit by providing his competitor with an allegedly unfair advantage. But “a decline in property value, by itself, cannot support a substantive due process claim.” Kriss v. Fayette Cty., 827 F. Supp. 2d 477, 493 (W.D. Pa. 2011), aff’d, 504 F. App’x 182 (3d Cir. 2012). Accordingly, to the extent Frompovicz seeks to assert a substantive due process claim on the basis of Defendants’ alleged conduct vis-à-vis MCR, he fails to state a claim. But Frompovicz’s allegations that Defendants have prevented him from removing and [*16] selling his own water—for example, by unjustifiably refusing to finalize the “Corrections Completed Notice”—allege conduct that impinges on the use and enjoyment of his land. Accordingly, these allegations may support a substantive due process claim.

    Finally, Frompovicz has alleged that Defendants refused to finalize the Corrections Completed Notice, among other thing, in an effort to “silence and destroy” him and to benefit MCR. See Compl. ¶ 193. He has therefore alleged “conscience-shocking” conduct on the part of Defendants, that is, “conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest.”

    Procedural due process is a different entity.

    from De Sapio Props. #Six, Inc. v. Alexandria Twp., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65603 (D NJ 2017)

    The Third Circuit discussed procedural due process in DeBlasio, 53 F.3d 592:


    In order to establish a violation of his right to procedural due process,
    DeBlasio, in addition to proving that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a protected property interest,
    must establish that the state procedure for challenging the deprivation does not satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 680 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
    As we observed in Bello,a state provides constitutionally adequate procedural due process
    when it provides reasonable remedies to rectify a legal error by a local administrative body.
    Bello, 840 F.2d at 1128 (citations omitted).
    In other words, when a state “affords a full judicial mechanism with which to challenge the administrative decision”
    in question, the state provides adequate procedural due process, id.,
    whether or not the plaintiff avails him or herself of the provided appeal mechanism.
    Midnight Sessions, 945 F.2d at 682.

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  • ~したり (羅列)

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    ~したり (羅列)

    (OR)
    $$ The override signal is given at all times when the brush bar is jammed or retarded and is not triggered by the operatin…

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  • Director Andrei Iancu lauds risk takers, calls patent troll narrative ‘Orwellian doublespeak’

    Remarkably, in what I believe amounts to Orwellian “doublespeak,” those who’ve been advancing the patent troll narrative argue that they do so because they are actually pro-innovation. That by their highlighting, relentlessly, the dangers in the patent system, they actually encourage innovation. Right! … Look, people are free to express any point of view, and they can certainly advocate for weakening our patent system. But they should be up front about it. Those who spend their time and money…

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  • Can the Federal Circuit use Rule 36 Affirmances in PTAB Appeals?

    Inventor advocacy group US Inventor recently filed an amicus brief with the U.S. Supreme Court asking the nation’s highest court to grant a petition for writ of certiorari in Capella Photonics v. Cisco Systems. This case, if taken up on appeal, will require the Supreme Court to answer whether the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit operates in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 144, the statute governing how the Federal Circuit must respond to appeals of decisions from the U.S. Patent and Trademark…

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  • ~しつつ

                            目次はこちら

    ~しつつ

    –>~しながら

    (WHILE ~ING)
    $$ This allows the addition of future modems or other connectivity while still using the same connection port to connect to the line. / これにより、回線に接続するために同じ接続ポートを使用しつつも将来のモデムの増設または他の接続性が可能になる。(USP7587029)

    $$ A decoder decodes the compressed first video signal while preserving the parameters in association with the frames. / 復号器(D1)は、フレームに関連するパラメータを保存しつつ、圧縮された第1の映像信号を復号する。(USP6567128)

    (WHILST ~ING)
    $$ Compounds 1, 5 and 6 provide a ring stacking with Trp66 in the CRP ligand binding pocket, and thereby increasing binding affinity, whilst maintaining the calcium coordination. / 化合物1,5と6は、カルシウムの配位結合を維持しつつ、CRPのリガンド結合ポケットにおけるTrp66と環相互作用をする。(USP7615543)

    $$ In tapered region 380 of standard fiber 420, both core 410 and cladding 400 taper whilst retaining their independent identities. / 標準ファイバ420のテーパを付けた領域380では、コア410及びクラッド400の双方が、それぞれの独立性を保持しつつテーパが付いたものになっている。(USP6631234)

    $$ It is therefore possible to provide a casing of relatively small size for the drive unit 16 whilst achieving a better bass response than could be provided having regard to the volume of air in the region 62 on its own. / 従って、第2領域62の内部のみの気体容量によって与えられる低音応答に比し優れた低音応答を達成しつつ、ドライブユニット16のためのケースを相対的に小さくすることができる。(USP5537480)

    (WITH REFERENCE TO)
    $$ A third embodiment of the invention is now described with reference to FIG. 9. / 次に、図9を参照しつつ本発明の第三の実施の形態について説明する。(USP6339664)

    $$ An embodiment of a chiller in accordance with the invention will now be described by way of example and with reference to the accompanying drawings. / 次に、一例として且つ添付図面を参照しつつ、本発明による冷却装置の1つの実施の形態に関して説明する。(USP6098417)

    $$ One electronic circuit assembly in accordance with the invention will now be described by way of example with reference to the accompanying drawing. / 本発明による1つの電子回路アセンブリについて、添付の図1及び図2を参照しつつ以下に説明する。(USP5408567)

    (OTHER)
    $$ Metal and metal oxides that have been previously difficult to produce have been prepared in the reactor of the invention with significantly reduced blocking, e.g. silver, at around 60 m.sup.2/g. / 従来では生成することが困難であった、約60m2/gの金属及び金属酸化物(例えば銀)が、本発明の反応装置において詰まりを著しく低減しつつ調製されている。(USP7566436): with PP sth

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  • Supreme Court asked to apply Multiple Proceeding rule to end harassing validity challenges

    The Multiple Proceedings rule has become the essence of uncertainty. What exactly does it mean? §325(d) gives the PTO Director the authority to refuse a petition when “the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments” were previously presented. For IPRs like this one to proceed despite numerous prior rulings in various fora upholding a patent’s validity is a travesty. The facts of this case underscore the mischief that can befall a patent owner under the current practice of the PTAB,…

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  • Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Copyright Infringement Claims as Time-Barred and Based on Non-Credible Testimony

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently issued a summary order in Latin American Music Company v. Spanish Broadcasting System affirming a lower court’s judgment denying copyright infringement claims brought by music publisher Latin American Music Co. (LAMCO) against radio station owner Spanish Broadcasting System (SBS). The Second Circuit determined that LAMCO’s arguments on appeal were without merit and upheld findings that its infringement claims were either time-barred or…

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  • 実現(発明の)

                            目次はこちら

    実現(発明の)

    (EMBODY)
    $$ FIG. 1 is a schematic showing a network embodying the invention; / 【図1】 本発明を実現するネットワー…

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  • CBS dramas involving piracy of sand

    Back on June 19, 2018, IPBiz highlighted the episode of the CBS Show “Elementary” titled “Sand Trap,” which, among other things, involved some people stealing sand. [ “Curiously, however, not by the intellectual property theft victims, nor by the sand pirates. Rather, by a seemingly mild-mannered county government employee living by kick-backs from contractors. “]

    Flash forward to October 19, 2018, and an episode of the CBS Show “Hawaii Five-0″ also had a plot line involving theft of sand. [ season 9 episode 4 “A’ohe kio pohaku nalo i ke alo pali (On the Slope of the Cliff, Not One Jutting Rock is Hidden From Sight),” ] With an inside Sherlockian reference to “the game’s afoot,” one suspects this plot line similarity was quite intentional. The Five-0 episode got more mileage out of the sand theme, with McGarrett improbably jumping into a big sand mixer after a suspect, risking life and limb.

    The “bad guy” in both CBS shows was improbable. For Elementary, a meek but highly corrupt county official. For Five-0, a cheating husband, who hired a killer off the internet [Craigslist ?] for $2000, which killer killed the wrong [but same named] person first, which mistaken first killing cracked the case.

    There was a second plot line involving Jerry and Junior. Sadly, this included Jerry uttering a completely false statement of history that the Bell P-59 Airacomet was the first jet fighter. Several problems here. The P-59 was basically copied from the British Gloster E.28/39. The P-59 was technically impractical and ultimately scrapped, never flying in combat.
    One should review the story of Adolf Galland and the Me-262.

    See also

    from an IPBiz post on 2016:


    Yes, the Germans had jets during World War II in particular the Me-262. The Germans used the Me-262 to target bombers, as on March 24, 1945 over Berlin. From ww2f.com:

    The Me 262 was way ahead of it’s time. The ONLY proven method to successfully bring down an Me 262 was to attack it during take-off/landing. In the air, the Me 262’s job was to bring down bombers. This role was one that would be successfull. The P-51 was a superb prop fighter but in a head on fight with the Me 262, it would not win. The P-51 could out turn the Me 262 to get away but to catch up and make a kill….nope.

    Air & Space noted:

    more than 1,400 Me 262s were manufactured, but only some 300 flew combat.

    Read more: http://www.airspacemag.com/multimedia/the-worlds-first-combat-jet-78/#EYjUz8A5BeUf6WbQ.99
    Save 47% when you subscribe to Air & Space magazine http://bit.ly/NaSX4X
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    The jet fighter craft was an innovation.

    link: http://ipbiz.blogspot.com/2016/01/cbs-sunday-morning-on-january-10-2016.html
    [As to attacking bombers, note the story of Galland, and the internal German conflict over the proper
    use of the Me-262. How an invention becomes an innovation can depend on “how used;” recall the story of the
    computer mouse, among others, and various failed Xerox strategies.]

    the 2008 post on IPBiz
    http://ipbiz.blogspot.com/2008/05/simultaneous-invention-or-simultaneous.html

    As to the Elementary episode:

    US Patent 10,000,000 issues on 19 June 2018: COHERENT LADAR USING INTRA-PIXEL QUADRATURE DETECTION to Joseph Marron of Raytheon

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  • NASA Licenses Patent Portfolio to Achieve Widest Possible Distribution of Technology

    NASA will enter into a range of different patent license agreements from no-cost evaluation licenses up to exclusive license. The agency’s goal in licensing technologies is to reach the widest distribution possible for the commercialized technology. To some, it may seem unusual that exclusive licenses would be part of NASA’s licensing options if the goal was truly the widest distribution possible. “We’ll only grant an exclusive license if we believe that exclusivity leads to the widest…

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  • Trademark Alert: Unauthorized Changes to Trademark Applications and Registrations

    The United States Patent and Trademark Office sent an e-mail notifying stakeholders of an alarming ongoing scheme to hijack trademark files. Apparently, there has been a number of unauthorized changes made to active trademark applications and registrations. It seems that these changes are part of a larger scheme to register the marks of others on third-party brand registries. If a change is made to an application or registration an automated e-mail is immediately sent out by the USPTO. If you…

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  • What impact do government grants have on small tech firms?

    Most academic writing on direct government spending as an innovation policy tool focuses on how this mechanism compares with other policies rather than on the policy choices within the “direct spending” box. For example, in Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, Daniel Hemel and I considered a single category of “government grants—a category that includes direct spending on government research laboratories and grants to nongovernment researchers”—with a focus on the similarities among these direct spending mechanisms, and what makes them all different from the other tools in our four-box framework (R&D tax incentives, patents, and inducement prizes).

    But we noted that there is variation within each policy box, and that in practice the boxes form a spectrum rather than discrete choices. And it is certainly worth diving within each of the four boxes of our framework from Beyond to dissect these policy tools. There is of course an extensive literature already on optimizing within the “patent” mechanism, but legal innovation scholars pay far less attention to the other boxes, including grants.

    Even if one focuses on the most typical grants to academic scientists, there is some interesting research on the effect of different ways of awarding this funding, such as this paper by Azoulay et al. on NIH vs. HHMI grants. But the federal government also provides many other types of direct finding: in 2013, almost one-quarter of federal R&D expenditures went to for-profit firms. How does the theory behind this substantial expenditure of taxpayer funding differ from that for academic research, and what impact does it have in practice?

    A recent study from Aleksandar Giga, Andrea Belz, Richard Terrile, and Fernando Zapatero at USC and NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab at Caltech provides some data on the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program as administered by NASA. They find that compared with firms that do not receive these grants, “microfirms” (1-5 employees) with SBIR grants are twice as likely to produce patents and generate twice as many patents. They argue that this is unlikely to be due to a selection effect. They also find that the program does not show the same effect for larger firms, and they suggest that the size limitations for the program should be reconsidered.

    Giga et al.’s work focuses on just one corner of the extensive field of direct government science funding, but I hope legal scholars will incorporate empirical work like this to provide a richer understanding of this type of innovation policy.

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